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Abstract
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness
of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert,
that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that
in some instances an uninformed sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert
sender.
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1 Introduction
When does an expert benefit from her private information? We consider a general class
of Bayesian persuasion games where a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by
controlling the informativeness of a public signal. In the original model of Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth), the sender commits to the public signal prior to observing
any private information about the state. We extend the model to consider senders who are
experts, that is, senders who privately observe some information about the state prior to
choosing the public signal. By becoming an expert, the sender could possibly adjust the
public signal according to her new information. However, we show that the sender cannot
benefit from becoming an expert. We establish this result by following a replication argument
in much the same manner as the revelation principle: for any equilibrium of the informed
sender’s game, one can design a feasible signal of the uninformed sender’s game that induces
the same joint distribution over duples of action and state. We then show that in many
instances an ignorant sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert sender.
Our paper is related to the recent literature that studies the strategic design of a public
signal by an informed sender. Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012) consider a privately-informed
principal who can subject herself to a test designed to provide public information about
her type, and can optimally choose the test’s difficulty. Li and Li (2013) study a privately-
informed candidate who can choose the accuracy of a costly public signal (campaign) about
the qualifications of the politicians competing for office. Rayo and Segal (2010) study optimal
advertising when a company can design how to reveal the attributes of its product, but it
cannot distort this information. In those models the sender is constrained on the set of
signals that she can choose from. We take a different approach and study the class of
Bayesian persuasion models where the sender is unconstrained on her choice. As in KG, we
allow the sender to choose any signal that is correlated with the state. We contrast the sender
studied by KG, who can commit to a public signal prior to becoming privately informed,
to a sender who is privately informed before she can choose a public signal. Perez-Richet
(2014) considers an informed sender who might be constrained on her choice of a signal. In
his model the receiver can only take two actions (validation or non-validation) and there are
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only two types of senders, who receive the same net payoff from validation. In contrast to
that paper, we consider any finite set of types for the sender, any compact action space for
the receiver, and allow the sender’s utility to depend on the state. While Perez-Richet focus
on describing the equilibrium of the game in the binary state-binary type setup, our main
objective is to derived an upper bound on the sender’s benefit from private information.
2 The Model
Our model features a game between a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The receiver chooses
an action that affects the utility of both players. The sender has no authority over the
receiver’s actions, yet she can influence them through the design of a public signal that is
correlated with the state. We contrast two cases. The first case is the one studied by KG:
the sender has no private information about the state, or equivalently, she can commit to
the public signal (or to a disclosure rule) before becoming privately informed. In the second
case, the sender has private information about the state and cannot commit to the public
signal before becoming informed.
Preferences and Prior Beliefs: All players are expected utility maximizers and process in-
formation according to Bayes rule. The receiver selects an action a from a compact set A.
The sender and the receiver have preferences over actions characterized by continuous von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uS(a, θ) and uR(a, θ), with θ ∈ Θ and Θ a finite state
space. Players share a common prior belief p belonging to the interior of the simplex ∆ (Θ).
Private Information: The sender privately observes the realization of an exogenous signal pie,
with finite realization space. Let the sender’s type t ∈ ∆ (Θ) represent her interim belief after
observing the signal’s realization, i.e., Pr[θ|t] = tθ, and β(t) the probability of t. Let T be
the (finite) set of possible beliefs induced by pie. Bayes rules requires Eβ[t] =
∑
t∈T β(t)t = p.
The set T and the probabilities β(t) are common knowledge.
Information Control: After observing her private signal but before the receiver chooses his
action, the sender supplies a signal pi, consisting of a finite realization space Zpi and a family
of likelihood functions over Zpi, {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ, with pi(·|θ) ∈ ∆(Zpi). Signal pi is “commonly
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understood”: pi is observed by all players who agree on the likelihood functions pi(·|θ), θ ∈ Θ
(see Alonso and Caˆmara 2014 for a discussion of this assumption). We retain the assumptions
of KG regarding the set of signals available to the controller: she can choose any signal that
is correlated with the state, and signals are costless to the controller.
While the sender is free to design any signal pi, she can only supply one signal. We allow
the sender to use a mixed strategy σ over any finite set of signals Π. Formally, let Πt be
set of signals chosen with positive probability and let σ(pi|t) is the probability that a sender
with type t chooses signal pi ∈ Π. Let Π = ∪t∈TΠt be the set of signals that are chosen by
some sender’s type.
Timing: The sender privately learns her type t and then choses signal pi. The receiver
observes pi and its realization zpi ∈ Zpi, and chooses an action a(zpi, pi) ∈ A. Payoffs are then
realized.
Sender’s Equilibrium Payoff: We consider Perfect Bayesian equilibria. If signal pie is unin-
formative (t = p for all t ∈ T ), then the sender is uninformed and the game is equivalent to
the model of KG. In this case, an equilibrium exists and we can use the results from KG to
compute the sender’s maximum expected equilibrium payoff VU . If signal pie is informative
and an equilibrium exists, then let VI(t) be the equilibrium payoff of a sender with type t,
and
∑
t∈T β(t)VI(t) the weighted sum of payoffs across all the sender’s types.
3 Unimprovability of Expected Payoffs under Ignorance
We first show that privately obseving an informative signal prior to designing the public
signal does not confer any advantage to the sender. Indeed, we show that, in any Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the informed sender’s game, averaging the payoffs of each type of
sender cannot improve upon the sender’s equilibrium payoff in a game in which she has no
informational advantage over the receiver. We establish this result by following a replication
argument in much the same manner as the revelation principle: For any equilibrium of the
informed sender’s game, one can design a feasible signal of the uninformed sender’s game
that induces the same joint distribution over duples of (action, state) in A×Θ.
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Proposition 1 For any equilibrium of the informed sender game, with type-dependent pay-
offs VI(t), the sender cannot benefit from her expertise,
VU ≥
∑
t∈T
β(t)VI(t).
Proof : In equilibrium, the expected utility of type t sender from signal pi is
W (pi, t) =
∑
Zpi×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t) ,
where
Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t) = pi (zpi|θ) tθ,
a(zpi, pi) ∈ arg max Eµ(zpi ,pi) [uR(a, θ)] ,
and µ (zpi, pi) is derived from Bayes rule according to
µθ (zpi, pi) =
pi (zpi|θ) qRθ (pi)∑
θ′∈Θ pi (zpi|θ′) qRθ′(pi)
, with qR(pi) =
∑
t′∈T σ(pi|t′)β(t′)t′∑
t′∈T σ(pi|t′)β(t′)
.
Therefore, the equilibrium expected payoff obtained by type t is
VI(t) =
∑
pi∈Π
W (pi, t)σ(pi|t) =
∑
pi∈Π
σ(pi|t)
∑
Zpi×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t) ,
and the ex-ante expected utility over all types E [VI(t)] would be∑
t∈T
VI(t)β(t) =
∑
t∈T
β(t)
∑
pi∈Π
σ(pi|t)
∑
Zpi×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t) .
Define a new signal piu =
{
Zu, {Λ (·|θ)}θ∈Θ
}
with signal realization space
Zu = {(pi, zpi) ∈ Π× ∪pi∈ΠZpi : zpi ∈ Zpi} ,
and satisfying
Λ (pi, zpi|θ) pθ =
∑
t∈T
Ψ (zpi, θ|pi, t)σ(pi|t)β(t)
for each (pi, zpi) ∈ Zu. Interchangeability of Bayesian updating implies that
µθ (zpi, pi) =
pi (zpi|θ)
∑
t′∈T σ(pi|t′)β(t′)t′θ∑
θ′∈Θ pi (zpi|θ′)
∑
t′∈T σ(pi|t′)β(t′)t′θ′
=
∑
t′∈T Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t)σ(pi|t′)β(t′)∑
θ′∈Θ
∑
t′∈T Ψ ((zpi, θ) |pi, t)σ(pi|t′)β(t′)t′θ′
=
Λ (pi, zpi|θ) pθ∑
θ′∈Θ Λ (pi, zpi|θ′) pθ′
= µRθ (zpi, pi) .
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Therefore, a(pi, zpi) ∈ arg max EµR(zpi ,pi) [uR(a, θ)] with µRθ (zpi, pi) = Λ(pi,zpi |θ)pθ∑
θ′∈Θ Λ(pi,zpi |θ′)pθ′
, so a(pi, zpi)
is an optimal response by the receiver under piu. The expected utility of an uninformed sender
when offering signal piu is
ES [uS|piu] =
∑
Zu×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Λ (pi, zpi|θ) pθ .
By interchanging the order of summation we have
ES [uS|piu] =
∑
Zu×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Λ (pi, zpi|θ) pθ
=
∑
t∈T
β(t)
∑
(Zu)×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Ψ (zpi, θ|pi, t)σ(pi|t)
=
∑
t∈T
β(t)
∑
pi∈Π
σ(pi|t)
∑
Zpi×Θ
uS(a(pi, zpi), θ)Ψ (zpi, θ|pi, t)
=
∑
t∈T
βtVI(t) ≤ VU .

By gathering information about the state prior to designing a signal, the sender can
choose a signal that induces actions in the receiver that have a different correlation with
the underlying state. However, the receiver’s posterior belief is pinned down by the sender’s
behavior and the observed signal realization for the chosen signal. Therefore, an uninformed
sender can replicate this behavior by designing a signal that, from an ex-ante perspective,
induces the same joint-distribution between receiver’s beliefs and the state. As any weighted
average of type-dependent payoffs can be replicated by an ignorant sender, having access to
a private signal of the state cannot allow the sender to improve her payoff.
Proposition 1 established that the sender cannot benefit from observing pie. Can the
sender be made strictly worse off because of her expertise? The following example shows
that this is indeed possible. Let Θ = {θ, θ} ⊂ R, where θ < θ. Let A = [θ, θ] and
uR(a, θ) = −(a−θ)2, so that a receiver with interim belief q chooses action a∗(q) =
∑
θ∈Θ qθθ.
Consider a sender who strictly benefits from higher actions, uS(a, θ) = f(a) where f
′(a) > 0.
Suppose that it is not optimal for the uninformed sender to choose a fully informative
public signal. In this case, if the private signal pie induces at least one sender’s type to be
sufficiently confident about θ, then the sender is on average hurt by her expertise. This
is so because there is no equilibrium in the informed sender game that induces the same
5
probability distribution over receiver’s actions as in the uninformed sender game. To see
this, by contradiction, suppose that there is an equilibrium in the informed sender game that
induces the same probability over receiver’s actions as in the equilibrium of the uninformed
sender game. Since the uninformed sender does not choose a fully revealing signal, there
exists at least one signal realization that is induced with strictly positive probability by
both states. Therefore, the receiver takes with strictly positive probability at least one
action strictly lower than θ. This implies that conditional on the state being θ, the receiver
on average takes an action strictly lower than θ. Consequently, a sender’s type who is
sufficiently confident about θ is strictly better by deviating to a fully informative signal, a
contradiction to the equilibrium assumption.
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